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Introduction 
 
 
 
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), there has been a fresh 
outbreak of tensions on euro area sovereign debt markets. On this occasion, the main trigger 
was market doubts over the capacity of Irish public finances to absorb the problems besetting 
the banking sector. This led to the launching, in late November, of a financial assistance 
programme for the Irish economy by its EU partners and the IMF. 
 
The markets’ doubts spread to other euro area countries, with the Spanish economy and its 
banking sector, particularly its savings banks, among those most affected. Compounding this 
was the weakness in 2010 of the Spanish economy, which nevertheless embarked upon a 
path of slow recovery in the final quarter of the year. 
 
Since late November 2010, Spain has tended to decouple from the countries most affected by 
the euro area sovereign debt market tensions, which led Portugal to apply for financial 
assistance in late March. Favouring Spain have been the market expectations about a 
forthcoming reform of the financial support mechanism in place for countries in difficulty, such 
expectations having been confirmed by the agreement reached by the euro area Heads of 
State and of Government on 11 March, and by the measures adopted by the Spanish 
authorities. 
 
The measures adopted by the Spanish authorities were specifically within the realm of the real 
economy, strengthening the commitments entered into regarding fiscal consolidation, while 
tackling structural reforms, especially in connection with the labour market and pensions. As to 
the banking sector, from late 2010 to date measures have revolved around two issues. First, 
around the requirements of the Banco de España that banks substantially increase their 
transparency, providing all relevant information to the markets on their exposure to the 
construction and real estate development sector, and also around their retail mortgage 
portfolios. Second, in the opening days of March 2011, the Parliament approved the Royal 
Decree-Law that stipulates the core capital requirements for all banks of 8% or 10%.  
 
In any event, and despite the fact that Spain, as indicated, has tended to decouple from the 
countries most affected by the market tensions, the environment for Spanish deposit 
institutions proved to be a very complicated one in 2010.  
 
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain continues to post negative year-on-year rates of 
change. Although in recent months these rates have been less sharp than in previous periods, 
they are not expected to recover significantly in the coming months. This is due both to the 
weakness of the real economy and the difficulties on funding markets, and to the natural 
reduction of debt by Spanish households and firms following its notable increase during the 
economic boom years. 
 
Resident private sector doubtful assets are growing less sharply than in previous years, 
although in the closing months of 2010 there was a slight rise in this variable. This rise is 
associated with the increase in non-performing loans in the construction and real estate 
development sector, which traditionally shows higher doubtful assets ratios than the average 
for the portfolio owing to its strong cyclical profile. Defaults on lending granted to individuals 
and to business activities other than construction and real estate development have tended to 
ease off in the past quarter, a trend which in some cases was observable even before this. 
Non-performing loan-related problems are especially associated with the financing of 
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construction and real estate development activities, in particular for certain savings banks, as 
these were the institutions that accumulated most imbalances during the Spanish economy’s 
expansionary phase. Set against this, the retail mortgage portfolio continues to post very low 
and, in 2010, diminishing doubtful assets ratios. The lower relative risk associated with this type 
of financing (to individuals for house purchase) is something that has traditionally been seen in 
the Spanish banking sector.  
 
Spanish deposit institutions have written down their balance sheets most considerably since 
early 2008. From that time to date, asset value corrections, via provisions, have amounted to 
approximately 9% of Spanish GDP. And to this must be added an increase in surplus tier 1 
capital over minimum requirements, which accounts for 5% of GDP in absolute terms.  
 
Since the international financial crisis broke in the summer of 2007, funding markets have 
continued to face notable difficulties. The bout of tension in late November 2010 in the euro 
area adversely affected market accessibility and the spreads on Spanish deposit institutions' 
primary market issues. Money markets have remained more stable than primary markets, and 
Spanish institutions have been able to resort to the interbank market, in particular through 
central counterparty clearing houses. This has translated into a substantial reduction in funds 
obtained from the Eurosystem, such funds resuming levels around Spain’s capital key in the 
euro area.  
 
Banks’ income statements remain subject to downward pressure owing to the narrowing of the 
net interest income margin, and to the still-high weight of impaired financial assets. Against this 
background, lower operating costs are proving key to cushioning banks against the 
aforementioned downward pressures. Following the approval in 2010 of the savings bank 
integration processes, the associated synergies and cost savings, explicitly included in the 
integration plans of the institutions that have received support from the FROB, should 
materialise in 2011.   
 
Spanish institutions’ tier 1 solvency ratio in 2010 was higher than that recorded in 2009, insofar 
as the increase in core capital offsets the slight growth in risk-weighted assets. In any event, 
the new Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 requires Spanish banks to operate with core capital ratios 
of 8% or 10%. For those institutions that need to increase their capital to meet these new 
demands, there is the possibility of tapping the markets. But the FROB is in any case 
committed to providing the funds needed for this purpose. What is more, the new measures 
approved encourage, insofar as participation by the FROB is necessarily temporary, the entry 
of private investors, making management more professional and providing for more effective 
market discipline over banks. Accordingly, the new Royal Decree-Law raises banks’ core 
capital requirements to new and demanding levels. It also introduces further incentives for the 
transformation of the Spanish banking sector, and in particular of savings banks, hitherto 
characterised by their singular corporate structure.  
 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, Spanish banks have recorded highly substantial 
provisions, amounting to more than 9% of GDP. Following the restructuring of their balance 
sheets and the integration processes pursued under the FROB, the new core capital 
requirements should gradually contribute to dispelling market doubts over the soundness of the 
Spanish banking sector. For this to occur, the still-slow path of recovery on which the Spanish 
economy embarked in 2010 must become entrenched, while both the fiscal consolidation 
programme approved by the government and the structural reforms under way must take hold. 
Despite this outlook, this does not preclude the fact that the environment in which Spanish 
deposit institutions will be operating in the coming months will still be difficult.   
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1   Macroeconomic risks and financial markets  
 
 
 
Since the publication of the last FSR, international financial developments have differed from 
region to region. In the United States, the risk premium on fixed-income securities fell while 
stock market values rose against the background of the brighter US economic outlook and the 
publication of favourable business results (Chart 1.1). This was also reflected in higher long-
term government bond yields, which spread to the top-rated sovereign debt in Europe. 
Nonetheless, in mid-April the rating agency Standard and Poor’s put US debt on negative 
watch, which prompted expectations concerning the growth of this economy to ease in the 
face of a more-imminent-than-expected fiscal consolidation scenario. Stock markets in the 
emerging countries moved on a rising trend, though less so than in those of the main 
developed markets.  
 
In the euro area there was a fresh outbreak of tensions on sovereign debt markets. On this 
occasion the main trigger was the growing market concern over the implications for Irish public 
finances of the problems assailing its banking sector. Such concern made it necessary for 
Ireland’s EU partners and the IMF to launch a financial aid programme in late November.  The 
turbulence spread to other euro area countries, with the Spanish economy once again among 
those most affected. The reflection of this was a rise in the yield spreads on Spanish public 
debt relative to German bonds, along with greatly limited access and dearer funding for 
Spanish credit institutions on wholesale markets (Chart 1.1). Listed company share prices, 
especially those of financial companies, fell back. The tension peaked in late November. Since 
then there has been an improvement, albeit amid high volatility, with the result that Spain has 
tended to decouple from the countries most affected by the tensions, despite the turbulence 
worsening in some of them. This is particularly the case in Portugal, which finally requested a 
financial assistance program in the closing days of March. Market expectations about the 
forthcoming reform of the current financial aid mechanism for countries in difficulty (which has 
been confirmed in the agreement reached by the euro area Heads of State and of Government 
on 11 March) and the particular measures adopted in Spain have both proved conducive to 
these more positive developments.  
 
The Spanish authorities have moved towards greater transparency, requiring banks to publish 
detailed information on their exposures and provisioning for risks in the real estate sector and on 
their liquidity position. They have also reinforced the solvency of these institutions, raising the 
minimum capital requirements. However, despite the improvement in recent months, the risk premia 
on fixed-income securities issued by the public and financial sectors remain at very high levels. This 
has been accompanied, moreover, by an increase in market expectations about official euro area 
interest rates (confirmed at the ECB Governing Council meeting on 7 April, as these rates were 
raised by 25 bp), which has been reflected in increases in interbank yields.  
 
Another factor bearing on financial market developments during this period was the high rise in 
commodities prices, particularly oil. Behind this lies a notable increase in demand, especially in 
the emerging countries. Nonetheless, certain supply-side factors such as the tensions in the 
Middle East and in North Africa, in the case of oil, might subsequently have contributed to this 
rising trend, which may have been accentuated by financial factors in a setting of ample 
liquidity and investor interest for this type of asset. These developments had a negative effect 
on the price of higher-risk assets traded on international financial markets and were also 
reflected in a rise in share price volatility. More recently, another shock has also made an 
impact, namely the successive natural disasters and nuclear crisis in Japan. The possibility that 
this might affect global economic recovery led, in the days following the disasters, to an easing 
International financial 
developments differed from 
region to region: risk premia 
fell and stock prices rose in 
the United States, and long-
term interest rates increased 
on the best-rated sovereign 
debt in the developed 
economies. 
There has been a fresh 
outbreak of market tensions 
further to the Irish crisis, with 
the Spanish economy once 
more among those most 
affected. Expectations of 
changes to the European 
financial aid mechanism and 
the measures adopted at 
the national level have 
contributed to easing the 
tensions somewhat, but risk 
premia remain at high levels. 
This has been accompanied 
by a rise in interbank interest 
rates in the area. 
On the commodities markets 
there were strong price 
increases, which quickened 
further to the geopolitical 
tensions in the Middle East 
and North Africa. This 
adversely affected higher-risk 
asset prices, as did too the 
natural disasters in Japan.  
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in the oil price and to a slight reduction in the interest rates on the developed countries’ top-
rated public debt, but these movements were subsequently reversed.  
 
Following a moderate economic slowdown in mid-2010, there was a fresh rise in global 
economic activity in the final stretch of the year. As a result, the slowdown in world GDP in 
the second half of 2010 was less than expected, dipping from rates of approximately 
5.2% to 3.7%. The latest indicators – mainly business survey and world trade data – 
appear to augur an acceleration in economic activity in 2011 Q1. The emerging economies 
continue to post high growth and in some there are signs of overheating, while in the 
industrialised economies growth is significant although more modest, with unemployment 
rates that remain high. Growth projections for 2011 point to an increase in world GDP 
somewhat below that in 2010 (4.5% against 5%), though they have been revised upwards 
due, above all, to the fresh stimuli in the United States. The advanced economies will grow 
by around 2.5%, and the emerging countries by approximately 6.5%.  
 
In the closing months of 
2010, global economic 
activity began to pick up 
again, following the 
slowdown mid-year. 
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In the euro area, despite the sovereign debt crisis, economic activity continued to pick up, 
albeit at a moderate pace differing from country to country. In Q4 GDP grew by 0.3% in 
quarter-on-quarter terms, and by 2% compared with the same period a year earlier (Chart 
1.2.A). The ECB’s March projections point to continuing growth, ranging from 1.3% to 2.1% 
for 2011, and from 0.8% to 2.8% for 2012.  
 
The Spanish economy resumed a path of slow recovery in 2010 Q4, posting quarter-on-
quarter GDP growth of 0.2%, after the flatness of the three previous months, and of 0.6% in 
year-on-year terms (Chart 1.2.A). This growth was accompanied by an easing in the pace of 
job destruction (Chart 1.2.B). The indicators available for the opening months of 2011 broadly 
suggest these trends will continue.  
 
The household and corporate debt ratio fell very slowly during the second half of 2010, and 
therefore remains high. Nevertheless, the low level of the cost of funds has contributed to 
containing the associated interest burden, which continued to decline; that said, against the 
background of rising interest rates, the declining course of the burden will tend to be 
exhausted. In the case of households, these developments have been accompanied by further 
- although moderate - falls in net wealth, the result of the decline in property values and of the 
less favourable course of income (which fell in real terms over 2010 as a whole). In contrast, 
corporate profits have picked up somewhat. 
 
The pace of general government debt, despite easing, still stood at a year-on-year rate of 
13.8% in December 2010 (19.1% in June). These dynamics, along with the sluggish increase in 
GDP, have led the debt/GDP ratio (60% of GDP in December) to continue rising, while the debt 
burden stood at close to 2% of GDP. 
 
The euro area economy 
grew in 2010 Q4 at a 
moderate pace that differed 
from country to country. The 
ECB foresees a continuing 
growth trajectory for this 
year and the next. 
Economic activity in Spain 
grew slowly in 2010 Q4, 
while the rate of job 
destruction eased.  
Household and corporate 
debt has scarcely fallen… 
… while general government 
debt continues to increase, 
although its pace is easing. 
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The Banco de España March macroeconomic projections point to a gradual improvement in 
economic activity for this year and the next. The GDP growth rate is expected to stand at 0.8% 
in 2011 and at 1.5% in 2012. this scenario is expected to be compatible with job creation from 
the second half of this year. Nonetheless, these projections are shrouded in high uncertainty.1
 
 
 
1. For further details on these projections and the uncertainty surrounding them, see “Spanish economic projections 
report”, Economic Bulletin, April 2011, Banco de España. 
The Banco de España 
projections point to a 
gradual improvement in 
economic activity during this 
year and the next. 
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2   Deposit institutions and other financial market participants 
 
 
 
Since the publication of the previous FSR, the Spanish authorities have taken measures 
additional to those adopted up to mid-2010 (see Box 2.1), both in the macroeconomic 
and in the financial spheres. In the macroeconomic field, a stringent fiscal consolidation 
plan was reaffirmed and structural reforms were undertaken in various areas, particularly 
in labour and pensions. In the financial domain, two lines of action were taken. First, the 
recommendations to institutions on transparency were made substantially more 
demanding, particularly with regard to their loan portfolios in the construction and real 
estate development sector and to their lending to households for house purchase. And 
second, in early March 2011 Parliament approved the Royal Decree-Law establishing the 
core capital requirements for all institutions at either 8% or 10%, as appropriate. 
 
During 2010 savings banks embarked on processes of integration. At the same time, 
deposit institutions wrote-down their balance sheets, recognising  €96 billion of losses 
on their assets through provisions since January 2008 (9% of GDP). They also increased 
their capital (tier 1) buffer by an amount similar to 5% of GDP. The new Royal Decree-
Law makes it compulsory for banks to operate with these new levels of core capital. 
This, along with the progress in the processes of integration1
 
 and the increased bank 
transparency, should gradually strengthen confidence in the Spanish banking sector. 
However, for this to eventuate, it is also essential to successfully carry through the 
structural reforms and the fiscal consolidation programme. 
The consolidated total assets2
 
 of deposit institutions as a whole stood at €3.78 trillion in 
December 2010 (see Table 2.1). 
The financing to the private sector (credit plus fixed income) in December 2010 remained at 
the levels of December 2009 (see Table 2.1). A large part of the behaviour of the financing to 
the private sector in the consolidated balance sheets is explained by that of credit to the 
private sector resident in Spain, which, as analysed in greater detail below, fell at a year-on-
year rate of 0.8%. Although this decline in credit to the resident private sector in Spain is less 
sharp than in December 2009 (-2%), the negative rate of change reflects the weak 
macroeconomic situation and difficult conditions in the international financial markets. The 
backdrop to these developments was one of progressive reduction in the debt of Spanish 
firms and households after a sharp increase during the prolonged period of economic growth. 
 
Financing to general government posted a year-on-year change of 10% (see Table 2.1), which 
was less sharp than in December 2009. The lower, albeit still high, growth of this variable is 
 
1. One of the operations making up the savings bank restructuring process (which involves a reduction from 45 savings 
banks to 17 savings banks or groups of savings banks) could not be concluded. This was the so-called Banco Base 
project, which would have combined four savings banks (Cajastur, Caja Cantabria, Caja Extremadura and Caja de 
Ahorros de Mediterráneo). In fact, it was the one integration project which did not have in place all the agreements and 
all the necessary authorisations to make the process irreversible under the conditions set by the Banco de España. The 
data included in this FSR on the restructuring processes do not consider this occurrence. See: 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/prensa/Notas_Informativ/anoactual/presbe2011_10e.pdf 
2. In 2010 there was a process of adjustment which reduced the number of banking groups and, as a result, the first-
time financial statements have updated book values. The consolidated balance sheets as at 31 December 2010 include 
aggregate figures of the banking groups existing at that date, which differ from those a year earlier. For their part, the 
consolidated income statements, since most of the aforementioned processes of integration took place in the last few 
days of 2010, relate to the groups which existed at the beginning, not the end, of the year, because otherwise most of 
the results would relate to a very brief period of time, which would prevent a proper understanding of how the business 
performed over the whole of 2010. In any event, in interpret ting the figures given in this FSR, the reader should take this 
considerations into account. 
2.1 Deposit  
institutions 
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS 
 
The Spanish authorities took 
additional measures in the 
macroeconomic and 
banking areas, stepping up 
the transparency and core 
capital requirements. 
Banks have recognised 
losses on their assets 
through additional provisions 
amounting to the equivalent 
of 9% of GDP. 
The sluggish lending to the 
Spanish resident private 
sector persisted,… 
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explained by the performance of fixed income, which slowed notably throughout the reporting 
period. 
 
Total doubtful assets at consolidated level continued to post positive rates of change (14% in 
December 2010, see Table 2.1), but grew less sharply than in previous years (48% in December 
2009 and 244% in December 2008). In line with the rise in doubtful assets, the total doubtful 
assets ratio at consolidated level stood at 4.1% (see Table 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN RELATION TO THE 
SPANISH BANKING SECTOR SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS IN SUMMER 
2007  
 
                  BOX 2.1 
 
Since the summer of 2007 there have been three specific crises 
which have impacted, to differing degrees, the Spanish banking 
sector. The aim of this Box is to briefly explain these crises and 
review the measures adopted in each of them.  
 
The international financial crisis 
 
The international financial crisis broke in summer 2007, and was 
exacerbated following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. At that time, as the habitual financial stress indicators reflected, the 
international financial system was on the verge of collapsing. The 
widespread worsening in confidence and the disappearance of liquidity, 
combined with the impact of financial products that were ultimately 
labelled as toxic, obliged different governments to assist large-scale 
banks at the international level.  
 
The impact of this first phase of the crisis was very limited for 
Spanish banks, particularly as regarded their solvency. The 
reason was that Spanish banks pursued a traditional retail 
banking model, and did not partake of the originate-to-distribute 
model. Further, the regulatory and supervisory authorities at the 
Banco de España stipulated that off-balance sheet vehicles 
(conduits and SIVs) be consolidated, thereby demanding capital 
and provisioning requirements. As a result, Spanish banks, unlike 
those in other countries, did not create this type of off balance-
sheets structure.  
 
Notwithstanding, the situation on international financial markets was 
very difficult, as confidence and – by extension – liquidity evaporated. 
As part of the European measures in this connection, and to avoid a 
potential bottleneck from affecting Spanish banks, two mechanisms 
were adopted. The first was a high-quality asset acquisition 
programme (FAFA). And the second, guarantees for new issues by 
Spanish banks, aimed at endowing such issues with a greater degree 
of confidence in what was, as explained, a very complicated 
environment. It should further be added here that the Eurosystem 
approved the provision of unlimited liquidity.  
 
The economic crisis in Spain 
 
As was the case internationally, the year 2009 was marked by the crisis in 
the real economy. As regarded Spain, the incipient correction of the 
economic imbalances that had built up during the growth phase 
interacted with and exacerbated the prolonged and acute international 
financial crisis.  
 
Unlike the previous phase of the crisis, the downturn in the real 
economy directly impacted Spanish bank balance sheets, through 
asset impairment, particularly assets linked to the real estate 
development sector. That highlighted the imbalances that the 
Spanish banking sector – especially some specific banks – had built 
up. Of specific note were the excessive investment in the real estate 
development sector, excess capacity, especially bearing in mind how 
financial and economic activity will foreseeably fare in the coming 
years, and the dependence on wholesale funding, since although 
maturities were concentrated in the longer-dated terms, such 
dependence exposed Spanish banks to the tensions still prevailing on 
international markets.  
 
Looking ahead to the potential difficulties that certain banks might face, 
and following the experience gained after taking official control of Caja 
Castilla-La Mancha, the decision was taken in June 2009 to create the 
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB).  
 
As is known, the FROB turns on two functions or mechanisms. First, it 
reinforces the intervention mechanism in the event it should have to act in 
a bank undergoing problems that affect its viability. In this respect, it is set 
up as a flexible mechanism that provides for measures to be taken in this 
type of situation. The second mechanism focuses on the provision of aid 
to institutions which, while viable, are involved in integration and 
restructuring processes. This second mechanism through which the 
FROB acts was also intended to reorder the banking sector so as to 
adjust its excess capacity, while affording greater operational size to 
banks which, otherwise, would face even greater difficulties gaining 
access to the wholesale funding markets.  
 
… while doubtful assets 
grew less sharply. 
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From the entry into force of the FROB to date, its first mechanism, i.e. 
the intervention mechanism, has only had to be applied in the case of 
CajaSur. The second mechanism, that of supporting integration 
processes between viable institutions so as to strengthen their 
solvency and provide for their restructuring, has resulted in the 
approval of nine integration processes. Total aid committed by the 
FROB to these processes has amounted to €11.6 billion.  
 
In addition to the integration processes supported by the FROB, 
three further integration processes have come to fruition. Thus, to 
date, 12 such processes have been finalised in the savings bank 
sector, in which 40 institutions have participated. Starting from a total 
of 45 savings banks in Spain, there are now 17 institutions or groups.  
 
The action taken by the FROB in this area has responded to the 
objectives set. Firstly, the excessive fragmentation of the sector has 
been corrected, with average assets per institution (or group of 
institutions) rising from €29 billion to €76 billion. Further, capacity has 
been reduced, since the processes approved by the FROB entail 
restructuring plans that bear on cuts in costs and central services. 
Cuts in the number of offices of between 10% and 25% are 
expected, alongside staff cuts of between 12% and 18%. Finally, 
write-downs on the balance sheets of the institutions that have 
integrated have also been significant, with provisions charged to 
reserves increasing by €22 billion.  
 
The sovereign debt crisis 
 
The sovereign debt crisis affecting the euro area since early 2010 may be 
divided, in turn, into two episodes. The first derived from doubts over the 
sustainability of Greek public finances, doubts that fed through to other 
euro area countries and which, moreover, highlighted economic 
governance problems in the EU. This first episode of the sovereign crisis 
adversely impacted investor confidence about the soundness of the 
Spanish economy’s fiscal position. The repercussion of this was a rise in 
the cost of financing sovereign debt, and this fed through to Spanish 
banks’ financing possibilities. At the height of the tensions, the wholesale 
financial markets were closed to banks.  
 
The financial sector measures adopted (adding to the government’s 
structural reforms and its fiscal consolidation plan) turned on three 
elements: the tightening of provisioning rules, stress tests and reform of 
the regulatory framework for savings banks. 
 
Provisioning rules were tightened in the summer of 2010. Although these 
rules were already demanding in Spain, the Banco de España decided to 
amend them in two directions. On one hand, to accelerate the need to 
provision all loans in default status (100% coverage in a year), explicitly 
recognising the value of the collateral (calculated after applying severe 
haircuts based on the type of collateral). And on the other, to require a 
provisioning schedule for foreclosures and assets delivered in payment of 
debt. The outcome of this tightening of provisioning rules, combined with 
the efforts already made by banks in this connection since early 2008, is 
that the provisions since set aside account for around 9% of GDP. Bank 
balance sheets have thus been most significantly written down since 
then. 
 
The new savings bank legislation, approved via Royal Decree-Law 
11/2010, addressed two weaknesses in the sector: its inability to obtain 
own funds through means other than retaining profits, and governance. 
The reform offers different possibilities to savings banks as regards their 
corporate structure, and in particular it resolves the aforementioned 
limitations and is conducive to a better exercise of market discipline over 
these institutions. 
 
Finally, the stress tests conducted in Spain, as part of the European 
exercise in the summer of 2010, were favourably received by the financial 
markets. These tests were underpinned by several aspects, some of 
which distinguish them from those performed in other European 
countries. Firstly, the parameters used in the adverse scenario were very 
harsh. Secondly, virtually the entire Spanish banking sector was subject 
to these tests. Thirdly, highly detailed bank-by bank information was 
published. And finally, a previously created mechanism already known to 
the markets (the FROB) was at hand, which allowed the potential 
problems detected following the conducting of the stress tests to be 
resolved. 
 
The second episode of the sovereign debt crisis had its epicentre in the 
problems that arose in Ireland; adding to the doubts over Irish fiscal 
sustainability was a strong lack of confidence concerning the banking 
sector, and in particular the quality of loans and investments related to the 
real estate sector. Investors questioned whether, in a fiscal situation they 
considered weak, it was possible to withstand banking sector losses that 
were greater than those that were initially conceivable.  
 
The difficulties Ireland underwent quickly spread to other euro area 
economies. And this through two channels. Questioning the reliability of 
the stress tests published in Europe a few months earlier; and passing 
through the problems of the Irish real estate sector, and its links to the 
banking sector, to other countries in which there had also been sharp 
growth in house prices in the previous cycle. Although different problems 
are involved, at the centre of the latest episode of the sovereign debt 
crisis is Portugal, which in the opening weeks of April 2011 announced 
that it would seek financial assistance.1  
 
In addition to deepening the structural reform and fiscal consolidation 
measures adopted by the government in Spain, two fundamental 
measures were taken in relation to the banking sector.  
 
One involved a greater demand for transparency, especially regarding 
investment in the real estate development and construction sector, and 
also on the retail mortgage portfolio. Spanish banks must disclose this 
information in detail in their annual reports, although savings banks, 
subject to greater doubts, were required to do so earlier. Over the course 
of January, all savings banks have published this information, which will 
be included and auditors on the attendant annual reports. The remaining 
banks, in the main, have also disclosed this information ahead of 
schedule.  
 
The second measure is the new Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, which raises 
the capital ratios required of Spanish banks to 8% or 10%, defining these 
ratios, moreover, in terms of core capital. A more detailed analysis of this 
legislation and its consequences can be found in Chapter 3 of this FSR.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. See Box 2.2 regarding Spanish banks’ exposure to Portugal 
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Spanish deposit institutions continued to obtain funding from the Eurosystem, but from July 
2010 to a much lesser extent. The lower recourse to funding from the Eurosystem shows that 
Spanish deposit institutions raise funds on the wholesale market when they can do so. They 
largely access the interbank market through their operations in central counterparty clearing  
Despite the difficulties still 
persisting in the funding 
markets, Spanish institutions 
significantly reduced the  
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houses. However, that does not mean that the situation in the wholesale funding markets has 
fully returned to normal, and this is reflected in the behaviour of marketable securities (-12%) 
and, to a lesser extent, in subordinated debt (3%). The relative weight of private sector 
deposits in the consolidated balance sheets rose by 1 pp with respect to December 2009 
(see Table 2.1). 
 
The net worth of Spanish deposit institutions decreased by 2.7%, which is largely explained 
by the decline in accounting own funds (2.3%). This fall partly reflects the effects of the 
processes of savings bank integration. 
 
Business abroad represented 26.5% of total consolidated assets in December 2010. The 
operations abroad of Spanish institutions are basically pursued through subsidiaries which 
are financially autonomous and centre their activity on retail commercial banking. Therefore 
most exposure abroad does not represent positions in third countries financed with funds 
raised outside those countries, but rather arises from the subsidiaries’ ordinary activities, i.e. it 
reflects local activity financed in local currency. This is the case, for example, of Spanish 
banks’ exposures in Portugal (see Box 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
EXPOSURE OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR TO PORTUGAL 
 
                 BOX  2.2 
 
Spanish banks’ exposure to their Portuguese counterparts amounted 
to €63.5 billion in December 2010.1 
 
Irrespective of the fact that this volume of exposure accounts for only 
1.7% of deposit institutions’ consolidated assets, other factors must 
be taken into consideration to assess the significance of such 
exposure in terms of the potential losses that might arise from it in the 
event of problems materialising.  
 
In particular, a distinction should be drawn between what are Spanish 
banking sector exposures on wholesale markets and financed with 
funds obtained, from what are exposures arising from the pursuit of 
banking activity in Portugal via subsidiaries and branches, i.e. local 
activity financed in local currency. This distinction is important 
because the risks differed substantially. The losses on holdings of 
Portuguese debt would pass through directly and immediately to the 
portfolios of holders of such debt. In the second case, the damage 
would be indirect, and would operate through the potential 
impairment of subsidiaries’ income statements and of the value of 
Spanish groups’ holdings in them. That is to say, in the latter case 
risk will depend on the subsidiary’s assets and liabilities structure and 
on its capacity to manage a more difficult situation. 
 
In the case of the Spanish banking sector, 88% of the 
aforementioned amount is attributable to local activity by subsidiaries, 
and to a lesser extent branches, of Spanish groups. 95% of such 
activity is concentrated in the Spanish groups with the best credit 
ratings and with greater experience in the management of 
 
1. It amounts to €79.1 billion, 2.1% of overall deposit institutions’ assets if, in 
addition to financial assets, contingent commitments are considered. 
geographically diversified activities. Further, the relative weight of 
Portuguese subsidiaries in these groups is low, ranging from 2.1% to 
6.3% in terms of total assets. The activity of these subsidiaries is 
concentrated in the financing of resident private sector activities 
(87%) and is funded in the main by customer retail deposits raised in 
Portugal.  
 
The exposure held by these Spanish banking groups in Portuguese 
general government (the bulk of which central government) debt  of 
local exposure. Moreover, the losses that may have are already 
recognised on balance sheets, since the portion of this debt classified 
in the “held-to-maturity” portfolio is not significant. Nor is the amount 
of financing extended by Spanish groups to the Portuguese 
particularly sizeable, and in any event it is concentrated in the 
country’s main banks.  
 
Accordingly, the main potential channel of contagion for Spanish 
banks stems from how subsidiaries pursuing their activity in Portugal 
fare. And it is therefore confined to the impact this may exert as a 
result both of the impairment of subsidiaries’ income statements and 
of Spanish groups’ ownership stakes in these parents. This potential 
impact, even though it may be of some importance, would not be 
significant for Spanish banking groups. 
 
Finally, non-local activity, i.e. that not directly pursued by Spanish 
groups in Portugal, accounts for only 0.2% of the Spanish banking 
sector’s total assets. 
funding obtained from the 
Eurosystem. 
The reduction in net worth 
partly reflects the processes 
of savings bank integration. 
The risks associated with 
business abroad are linked 
to the operations conducted 
through subsidiaries, not to 
non-local activity. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   21   FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2011 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   22   FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2011 
 
 
Based on the individual bank information,3
 
 credit to the resident private sector in 
Spain showed negative year-on-year rates of change (-0.8% in December 2010, see 
Chart 2.1). The most recent data, relating to February, show that this trend persists  
(-1%). 
There are significant differences in the behaviour of credit to the resident private sector 
depending on the sector of activity (see Chart 2.1). Thus, in December 2010, loans on 
the balance sheet granted to individuals remained at the same levels as a year earlier, 
although those for house purchase rose somewhat more than 1% year-on-year. The 
increase in loans of this kind, particularly in the closing months of the year, was partly 
due to the rise in demand derived from spending decisions being brought forward to 
end-2010 for tax reasons. This would be consistent with the more recent behaviour, 
relating to January and February, of this kind of credit, which posted negative growth 
rates. Meanwhile, loans to individuals for purposes other than house purchase showed a 
negative change of 5.5%, which, although sharper than that a year earlier (-2.1%), is 
smaller than that in June 2010(-6.5%). 
 
Lending to non-financial corporations behaved very differently depending on whether it 
was to construction and real estate development firms or to other firms. Thus loans to 
construction and real estate development firms decreased by 5.2% in December 2010  
(-4.2% in December 2009). Those to other firms grew slightly in December 2010 (0.9%) 
after showing negative rates of change in June 2010 (-0.5%) and December 2009  
(-2.4%). 
 
Despite the relative recovery in credit for activities other than construction and real estate 
development, this variable is not expected to increase significantly in the next few months. 
 
3. The FSR uses consolidated data, which include activities abroad by Spanish institutions through subsidiaries, but 
also other data relating to individual balance sheets. The latter, whose use is indicated in the text, and likewise in the 
charts (by means of the abbreviation ID), allows the analysis to focus on the risks associated with developments in the 
Spanish economy and makes for a more detailed analysis owing to the greater information available. 
Credit to the resident private 
sector posted negative year-
on-year changes,… 
 
… particularly that to 
construction and real estate 
development firms. 
However this variable is not 
expected to recover  
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The uncertainty still prevailing with respect to the real economy and to the situation of the 
international financial markets further complicate the process of reducing the debt of 
Spanish firms and households following its notable rise in the years of economic 
expansion.  
 
The doubtful assets of the resident private sector in business in Spain posted a rate of 
change of 16% in December 2010. The rise in the closing months of 2010 (see Chart 2.2.A) is 
associated with construction and real estate development (see Chart 2.2.B). 
 
The doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector in Spain stood at 5.9% in 
December 2010. The trend of this variable, as indicated by the most recent data relating to 
February 2011, continues to be upward (6.2%). However, its rate of increase is lower than in 
previous quarters. 
 
significantly in the coming 
months. 
The increase in the doubtful 
assets ratio, which is 
moderate,… 
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The increase in doubtful assets in credit to the resident private sector in the fourth quarter of 
2010 is concentrated in the construction and real estate development sector. The doubtful 
assets ratio excluding that sector edged down from 3.5% in September 2010 to 3.4% in 
December 2010 (see Chart 2.2.B), whereas that of the construction and real estate 
development sector persisted in its upward trend. Thus, within non-financial corporations, 
credit for activities other than construction and real estate development went from 4.5% in 
September 2010 to 4.2% in December 2010 (see Chart 2.2.C). 
 
For individuals, the doubtful assets ratio in lending for purposes other than house purchase 
started to decrease from June 2010 when it was 6.1%, and by December 2010 it stood at 
5.9%. Meanwhile, lending to individuals for house purchase showed a doubtful assets ratio of 
2.8% in December 2009. Since then it has decreased gradually to 2.4% in December 2010 
(see Chart 2.2.C). 
 
In Spain, the retail mortgage portfolio has traditionally shown the lowest doubtful assets 
ratio. Thus, for example, in 1993, when the unemployment rate rose to around 24% and 
interest rates were five times higher than now, the doubtful assets ratio for house purchase 
loans was 4 pp lower than that for total loans. 
 
In addition to the foregoing, house purchase loans are backed by real estate collateral which 
consists of the very asset being financed. The purpose of this collateral is to limit banks’ 
potential losses. It is thus pertinent to look at the value of the loan with respect to the appraisal 
value of the collateral (LTV). This LTV averages 62% for Spanish banks and is distributed very 
evenly across them. Only 1.8% of house purchase loans have a LTV exceeding 100%, and 
17% have a LTV between 80% and 100%. 
 
Above it was noted that the increase in the ratio of doubtful loans to the private sector in 
Spain between September and December 2010 is explained by the increase in that ratio for 
loans to the construction and real estate development sector. The doubtful assets ratio 
of this sector reached 14% in December 2010 for total deposit institutions. The higher risk 
associated with this sector, which is currently undergoing extensive adjustment, derives from 
its markedly cyclical profile.  
… is concentrated in the 
construction and real estate 
development sector. 
The fall of the doubtful 
assets ratio in lending to 
individuals for house 
purchase was confirmed in 
2010. 
The retail mortgage portfolio 
has traditionally been little 
troubled by doubtful 
assets,… 
… and a factor limiting the 
potential damage is the 
value of the collateral relative 
to that of the loan. 
Construction and real estate 
development loans have a 
high doubtful assets ratio. 
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The potentially troubled loans in the construction and real estate development sector are 
not limited to doubtful assets. The Banco de España has adopted a rigorous stance in this 
respect and has defined potentially troubled loans to include standard loans under special 
surveillance and foreclosed assets and those received in satisfaction of debt. Standard 
loans under special surveillance are those which, although still current in payment, exhibit 
some weakness associated with the loan transaction itself or with the sector or borrower 
group with which the transaction was carried out. Banco de España rules require specific 
provisions to be set aside for these loans. Foreclosed assets and those received in 
payment of debt arise as a result of default on collateralised loans. The Banco de España 
supervises these transactions so that in no case do they result in delay in recognition of 
losses and it requires provisions to be recorded from the time of foreclosure (if not already 
in place).  
 
The serious difficulties experienced by the Irish banking sector reawakened misgivings as to the 
potential losses on Spanish banks’ loans to the construction and real estate development 
sector, particularly those of savings banks. The stress tests published by the Banco de España 
last July, which in Spain factored in falls of 50% and 62% in the price of houses under 
construction and of land, respectively, initially merited a favourable reception from investors (due 
both to the harshness of the scenarios and to the degree of coverage and the detailed 
institution-by-institution information published).   
 
For these reasons, in November 2010 the Banco de España decided that banks have to 
publish full details of their exposures to the construction and real estate development 
sector in their financial statements. Further, since the misgivings centred especially on 
the savings bank sector, these institutions were required exceptionally to publish this 
information early, which they did at the end of January 20114.
 
 
For savings banks, 46% of total lending to construction and real estate development firms is 
potentially troubled. Its coverage by specific provisions set aside by savings banks is 31%, 
this figure rises to 38% if general provisions are taken into account. 
 
These percentages of coverage reflect the notable effort made by Spanish banks in 
writing down their individual balance sheets since the beginning of 2008. Thus, 
from that time until now, the amount of the asset value adjustments via provisions is 
equal to approximately 9% of GDP for total deposit institutions. Of this total amount, €58 
billion arose through provisions recorded via the income statement, €16 billion came 
from the release of previously recorded general provisions and €22 billion reflect an 
addition to provisions with a charge to reserves as a result of balance sheet write-downs 
by the savings banks which have participated in integration processes (see  
Chart 2.2.D). 
 
To the foregoing should be added a notable increase in the tier 1 capital buffer over minimum 
requirements between 2008 and December 2010. This increase was equivalent to 5% of 
GDP.5 
 
 
4. In this regard see the notice published by the Banco de España “Savings banks: development and reform” on 21 
February 2011. 
(http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/secciones/prensa/reestructura_sane/ficheros/Notareformacajas20110217_IVI_en.pdf) 
 
5. This increase includes the contributions from the FROB already committed prior to Royal Decree-Law 2/2011. 
The definition of potentially 
troubled loans adopted by 
the Banco de España 
includes standard loans 
under surveillance and 
foreclosed assets. 
The Banco de España 
required total transparency 
from institutions in respect of 
their exposures to 
construction and real estate 
development. 
For savings banks, the 
provision coverage of 
potentially troubled loans is 
31%. 
Since the beginning of the 
crisis, Spanish deposit 
institutions have written 
down their balance sheets 
by an amount equivalent to 
9% of GDP… 
… and have increased their 
tier 1 capital buffer by 5% of 
GDP. 
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Since the outbreak of the international financial crisis in the summer of 2007, the funding 
markets have been beset by notable difficulties. During 2010 these difficulties intensified 
as a result of the episodes of tension associated with the sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area. 
 
In the first half of 2010, the sovereign crisis in the euro area was sparked by the fiscal 
sustainability problems of Greece. The doubts in this respect degenerated into a crisis of 
confidence, which particularly affected the economies whose budget deficits had worsened 
most or which had major imbalances. The Spanish markets were among those most affected 
by this period of tension, as evidenced by a rise in the risk premium (see Chart 2.3) and by a 
drop in the volume of debt securities issued by credit institutions, particularly in the second 
quarter of 2010. 
 
The measures taken by the Spanish authorities helped to improve investor confidence. First, 
a severe fiscal consolidation programme was adopted and structural reforms were 
undertaken. Second, in relation to the banking sector, not only was headway made in the 
savings bank restructuring under the auspices of the FROB, with amendments to the savings 
bank law, but also the already strict provisioning rules for Spanish banks were further 
tightened and the stress tests on the Spanish banking sector were published. In this respect, 
the stress tests conducted and published in Spain within the European framework used very 
strict stress parameters, encompassed practically all the Spanish banking sector and allowed 
the publication of highly detailed bank-by-bank information. 
 
As a result of this set of measures, and following the favourable reception of the stress tests 
conducted in Spain, an improvement was seen. This was perceptible in the reduction in the 
risk premium and in Spanish banks’ greater dynamism on both the primary markets and the 
interbank market, and there was progressively less resort to liquidity provided by the 
Eurosystem. 
 
However, in late 2010 there was a second bout of tension on the euro area sovereign 
debt markets, the epicentre of which was Ireland and the problems unfolding there. In 
this case, market doubts focused on the viability of Irish banks, in particular due to their 
exposure to the real estate sector, and on the capacity of the Irish public sector to 
withstand greater-than-expected losses arising from the banking sector. This episode 
spread to other euro area economies through two channels. The problems of the Irish 
banking sector and its links to the real estate sector were equated with those potentially 
existing in other countries, and the Europe-wide stress tests were called into question. 
With regard to the latter, the EBA is conducting European solvency tests during the first 
half of 2011, whose results are expected to be released by mid-June. The total number 
of institutions taking part is 91, 27 of which are Spanish, accounting for 88% of the 
Spanish system's total assets. The principal difference with this year's tests is the 
definition of capital used, which has taken into account the capacity to absorb losses 
under the going concern assumption as the chief quality of capital components. This is 
why Core Tier 1 has been defined as Tier 1 minus any type of hybrid plus any instrument 
subscribed by the State. The level set for approval is 5%. Notable also among the 
changes is the consideration of a harsher macroeconomic scenario, which includes a 
significant increase in the cost of funding for institutions, linked to sovereign risk, the 
application of more restrictive methodological assumptions and an exhaustive quality 
review of the results by the EBA.  
 
 
2010 was characterised by 
bouts of tension in the euro 
area public debt markets. 
In the first half of 2010, the 
tension was triggered by the 
fiscal sustainability problems 
of Greece, which spread to 
the other euro area 
economies. 
The measures adopted by 
the Spanish authorities 
helped to improve investor 
confidence. 
There was a further bout of 
tension in late 2010, on this 
occasion further to Ireland’s 
problems with its banking 
sector. 
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In any event, the contagion to the Spanish banking sector was notable, calling into 
question the quality of bank balance sheets, and in particular that of assets most linked 
to the real estate sector.  
 
The authorities reaffirmed their adhesion to the fiscal consolidation programme and structural 
reforms. And this, along with the new banking measures adopted, requiring firstly total 
transparency by banks regarding their exposures to the real estate sector, and further 
significantly increasing capital requirements (see Chapter 3), has contributed to the sovereign 
spread trending favourably, with a decoupling from developments in the countries most  
 
 
However, following the new 
measures adopted by the 
authorities, there has been a 
decoupling of the Spanish 
sovereign spread from those  
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affected by the market tension (see Chart 2.3). However, Spanish banks, whose activity is 
highly geographically diversified, have had to bear greater issuance costs, in view of the link 
between the sovereign risk premium and the risk premium that markets demand of these 
banks for their issues. These higher issuance costs are observed in particular in comparison 
with those that the market demands of the banks of other countries with lower sovereign 
spreads, and this irrespective of the specific situation of the banks in question. 
 
Spanish banks, confirming what has been seen since July 2010, have continued resorting to 
the interbank market, largely through the central counterparty clearing houses. As a result of 
the financial crisis, bilateral operations on these interbank markets ground to a halt. CCPs 
offer a market solution here, acting on their own account and freeing institutions from the 
counterparty risk inherent in the traditional interbank market. The money markets, despite still 
being affected by uncertainty and mistrust, have remained relatively stable following their 
recovery since July 2010 (see Chart 2.4.A). 
 
The above developments have made for a marked decline in dependence on Eurosystem 
funds, more notably so for Spanish banks than for the euro area as a whole(see Chart 2.4.A). 
From late September 2010 to late March 2011, banks resident in Spain reduced their gross 
recourse to the Eurosystem by €36.61 billion (-49%), while the reduction in the outstanding 
balance in the Eurosystem as a whole stood at €89.28 billion (-17%). 
 
Chart 2.4.B shows the changes in the volume allotted to institutions resident in Spain 
compared with the total provided by the Eurosystem. The percentage allotted in auctions to 
institutions resident in Spain has progressively fallen from its peak in July 2010. Compared 
with an average fall of 23% for July (29% in terms of the net loan), in September 2010 and in 
March 2011 the respective figures were 19% (22% in terms of the net loan) and 10% (12% in 
terms of the net loan) (see Charts 2.4.B and C), which is once again around Spain’s capital 
key in the euro area. 
 
Access to the primary markets, particularly the mortgage covered bond and senior debt markets, 
which had improved for Spanish banks following publication of the stress tests, became more 
complicated following the fresh outbreak of tension caused by the problems in Ireland. Although 
they have improved, security issues during the course of 2011 have been limited and generally the 
spreads of those that have been placed remain high. Conceivably, the measures taken at the end 
of 2010 to increase the transparency of Spanish banks, the higher core capital requirements (ratios 
of 8% or 10% under the new Royal Decree-Law) and the progressive recovery of economic 
activity in Spain will help to gradually build up investor confidence. 
 
The maturity structure of the medium- and long-term debt of Spanish banks is characterised by 
having the bulk of maturities at longer terms. The maturity profile is similar if short-term debt is 
included, albeit with an increase in the proportion of maturities in 2011 (see Chart 2.4.D).  
 
The drastic changes wrought by the financial crisis on the wholesale debt markets have induced 
financial institutions to begin readjusting the mix of their liabilities so that retail deposit funding is 
given greater relative importance than in the years before 2007. 
 
Although Spanish banks have traditionally enjoyed a solid retail deposit base, they also are 
participating in this general process of bank balance sheet restructuring. Thus the receipt of more 
corporate and household saving means that the ratio of deposits to loans has grown 
uninterruptedly since July 2008 (see Chart 2.5.A). This is occurring despite the fact that the growth  
 
of the economies subject to 
the biggest problems. 
Spanish banks have 
continued resorting to the 
money markets... 
...which has made for a 
marked decline in funds 
borrowed from the 
Eurosystem. 
Access to the primary markets, 
though it has improved, 
continues to be difficult and 
subject to high spreads. 
Maturities are concentrated 
in the longer terms. 
Banks have continued 
attracting more retail 
deposits, but at a more 
moderate pace… 
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rate of deposits, after various quarters in which it exceeded 10% per annum, has become 
progressively more subdued. The moderation of deposit growth rates (see Chart 2.5.B) is a natural 
consequence of, on one hand, the notable growth rate in previous years, and, on the other, the 
macroeconomic setting faced by households and firms. 
 
The heightened competition to attract retail deposits has put upward pressure on the 
rates offered for new time deposits. This brisker competition is a consequence of the 
higher cost of wholesale funding and of the balance sheet restructuring by banks. 
Although the higher cost of new time deposits has fed through only gradually to the 
average interest costs of banks (and thus to the income statement), the Banco de 
España has nevertheless cautioned them against the undesirable consequences of 
particularly aggressive commercial policies. Not only has it reminded banks that they 
should counteract the negative effect on the income statement by cutting costs more 
sharply, but also the FROB has instructed the institutions receiving public funds in 
integration processes that the nominal interest rate offered by them must not exceed the 
average of the highest rates on comparable products offered by the five main competitor 
credit institutions in the institution’s geographical market that have not received aid from 
the FROB. In addition, commercial actions must not negatively affect the income 
statement and must be in keeping with the business plan objectives set in the integration 
plans approved for the grant of aid. 
 
Deposit institutions reported consolidated profit attributed to the group of €16,734 
million from January to December 2010 (see Table 2.2)6. Return on assets (ROA) fell by 7 
basis points to 0.47% in December 2010. Return on equity was also down, dropping from 
9% in December 2009 to 7.9% in December 2010 (see Chart 2.6.A). 
 
These results are basically explained by two factors. The first is a fall in net interest income. The 
second is the impairment losses on financial assets (basically specific provisions) and non-
financial assets (provisions for foreclosures and assets received in satisfaction of debt, among 
others), which continue to have a significant weight in income statements. 
 
6. An analysis of these figures should take into consideration the circumstances mentioned in footnote 2 on this Chapter. 
… while the rates offered for 
time deposits continue to 
put upward pressure on 
funding costs. The FROB 
has set limits in this respect 
on the institutions that have 
received funds. 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY 
 
Consolidated profit fell… 
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Although financial costs fell in absolute terms more than financial revenue (-22.5% compared 
with -14.7%, respectively), the opposite occurred in terms of average assets (see Table 2.2). 
This resulted in a narrowing of the net interest margin which in absolute terms fell by 6.6% in 
December 2010 compared with the previous year (see Table 2.2), although the shrinking 
trend in the difference between marginal rates reversed slightly in the closing months of 2010. 
The reasons for that narrowing have not changed. To begin with, the cost of new time 
deposits has increased (see Chart 2.6.B) due to stronger competition among banks to attract 
retail savings. Although the average cost of liabilities changes more slowly, the increase in the 
cost of new funding is a factor which exerts upward pressure on it. This, along with the 
sluggish economic activity and the volume of non-interest-earning doubtful assets still on 
bank balance sheets, explains the downward pressure on the net interest margin (see Chart 
2.6.C).  
 
In any event, as noted above, if the strategies for attracting retail deposits put upward 
pressure on the average cost of funding, they must be accompanied by measures to lessen 
their negative impact on the income statement. There are two ways to do this. First, by 
reducing and optimising operating costs, and second, by balance sheet management to 
offset the fall in profitability by, for example, divesting unprofitable assets and improving the 
quantity and quality of services provided. For institutions that have received public funds to 
undertake processes of integration, the FROB has established the aforementioned limitations 
… due to the narrower net 
interest margin… 
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on the interest rates they can offer their customers, and, moreover, they must complete their 
integration and restructuring plans as soon as possible . 
 
Apart from the narrower net interest margin, the other factor exerting downward pressure 
on income statements is impairment losses on financial assets (specific provisions) and 
those associated with other assets (largely foreclosed assets). Thus provisions continued to 
eat up a substantial part of banks' net operating income: 56.5% in December 2010 (see 
Chart 2.6.D). However, in December 2009 their impact on net operating income was 
greater (66.5%).  
 
There are two reasons for the lower, albeit still significant, relative impact of provisions. The first 
is the behaviour of doubtful assets, the rate of increase of which is progressively moderating. 
… and due to the weight of 
specific provisions. 
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The second is the charge to reserves of €22 billion in various processes of integration, which did 
not have an effect on income statements but impacted net worth. 
 
2011 will foreseeably still be a complicated year for income statements, since the 
aforementioned factors will keep putting downward pressure on them. It can, however, be 
expected that the specific provisioning needs of banks will progressively diminish. 
 
A key factor in alleviating the pressure on income statements is operating expenses. In 
December 2010 consolidated operating expenses increased by 4.7% year-on-year7. 
However, in business in Spain they increased minimally, by 0.5%. Despite the moderation in 
operating expenses, banks have to make additional efforts to reduce them because they are 
the component of the income statement which can be used most effectively to counteract the 
shrinkage of the net interest margin and the still high, albeit falling, provisioning needs. Also, in 
the measure appropriate in each case, banks will have to correct their excess capacity. 
 
During 2011 the institutions involved in processes of integration will foreseeably cut their operating 
costs and, at the same time, the synergies derived from those processes will start to materialise. 
Thus, after the processes of integration were defined in 2010 (the year in which the issues relating 
to the governance of the new institutions were clarified) the emphasis will now be on focusing 
efforts on operating aspects, including most notably cost optimisation. Moreover, the institutions 
that received public funds have made specific commitments in this respect in their restructuring 
plans. 
 
Comparison of the 2010 results of the major European banks with those of the largest 
Spanish banks shows that in relative terms the return on equity continues to be favourable to 
the latter (see Chart 2.7.A). Nevertheless, the CDS spreads for large Spanish banks, although 
they have narrowed, are higher than for large European banks. The sovereign crisis and the 
uncertainty still prevailing in the market in this respect affect Spanish banks negatively, and 
this also impinges on their stock market prices (see Chart 2.7.B).  
 
The overall solvency ratio stood at 11.9% in December 2010, 33 bp less than in the same 
period of the previous year. However, the tier 1 ratio, which includes higher quality capital 
than the overall solvency ratio, amounted to 9.6%, 31 bp more than in 20098 (see Chart 
2.8.A). The disaggregated analysis shows that a large number of banks increased their tier 1 
ratio (see Chart 2.8.B). 
 
Risk-weighted assets, the denominator in the calculation of the solvency ratio, fell by 1% in 
December 2010, against a background in which lending activity continued to contract (see 
Chart 2.9.A). Thus, credit risk requirements, with a weight of 87% in the total, decreased by 
2.3%, as compared with growth of 1.3% recorded at end-2009. The next most important risk 
(weight of 8%) is operational risk, which decelerated by 7.5 pp to grow at 1.7%, while market 
and exchange risk (weight of 4%) rose by 31.8%. 
 
Total own funds fell in 2010 by 3.7% following their strong rate of growth in December 2009 
(8.9%). However, there was an improvement in the quality of own funds, since tier 2 capital 
fell more quickly, at a rate of 16.7%, while tier 1 capital, albeit more slowly (12.4 pp less than 
a year earlier), continued growing (3.5%, see Chart 2.9.B). 
 
7. Note that this figure refers to the consolidated income statement, which includes business activity abroad and is not 
therefore reflect the changes in institutions’ internal costs.  Such changes are influenced, into earlier, by exchange rates 
and shifts in the scope of consolidation. 
8. From June 2008 the figures are calculated as stipulated by CBE 3/2008, which transposes to Spanish law the EU 
directives setting out the changes to solvency rules made by Basel II. 
In any event, banks must 
reduce their operating 
costs… 
… which the new savings 
bank groups will foreseeably 
do this year. 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY 
 
The tier 1 solvency ratio 
increased,… 
… the slight rise in risk-
weighted assets… 
… being offset by the 
increase in higher-quality 
own funds. 
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Tier 1 capital continued growing thanks to the strong pick-up in common equity (10.7 pp), 
which posted a rate of change of 17.1%. Reserves decreased by 3.6% after growing by 
15.2% in 2009, although the tier 1 category was boosted by the FROB aid and the issuance 
of convertible bonds. Intangible assets slowed by 4.4 pp but continued growing due to the 
rise in goodwill (7.9%) (see Chart 2.9.C).  
 
Tier 2 capital fell more steeply (16.7%) as a result of a decline in all its components (see Chart 
2.9.D). Specifically, subordinated debt, with a weight of 77%, dropped by 13.8% as 
compared with no change in 2009, revaluation reserves fell by 52% and corrections to 
valuation adjustments were down by 63.5%. 
 
On 10 march 2011 Parliament passed Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 on new financial system 
reform measures. This Royal Decree-Law, the content and implications of which are analysed 
in more detail in Chapter 3 of this FSR, imposes a new core capital ratio of 8% for all deposit 
institutions.9 This ratio will be 10% for the institutions which depend more on wholesale 
funding10 
 
(i.e. those for which the ratio of wholesale funding less liquid assets to customer 
loans exceeds 20%) and whose third-party equity holders do not own at least 20% of capital. 
Spanish deposit institutions which have to increase their capital to meet the new requirements may 
seek the necessary funds in the market but, as explained in detail in Chapter 3 of this FSR, the 
FROB will be available to provide such funds as may be needed to meet the requirements of the 
Royal Decree-Law. This provision of funds, where needed, will be temporary.  
 
On 10 March the Banco de España published the capital needed by the institutions that 
have to increase capital to meet the new capital requirements. Of a total of 114  
 
9. The Tier 1 ratio shows the relationship between regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets, defining regulatory capital 
as capital, reserves and certain preference shares, less deductions that detract from its quality such as goodwill, for 
instance. Common equity Tier 1 is a new ratio established under Basel III, which focuses on higher-quality capital, 
essentially because it does not accept reference shares among the components of capital and it is more demanding in 
respect of regulatory adjustments. Finally, core capital is the concept introduced by RDL 2/2011 and, as indicated in 
Chapter 3 of this FSR, it is close to the Basel III concept of common equity Tier 1. 
10. Wholesale funding is defined in Banco de España Circular 2/2011. 
In any event, since the 
approval of Royal Decree-
Law 2/2011 Spanish banks 
operate with core capital of 
8% or 10%. 
The institutions which have 
to increase their capital and 
cannot do so through the 
market will obtain it from the 
FROB. 
The capital required to 
comply with Royal Decree- 
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institutions or groups of institutions (54 excluding credit cooperatives, none of which 
needs additional capital to comply with the new Royal Decree-Law), 12 need more capital, 
totalling €15,152 million. Of these 12 institutions, 8 are savings banks, which have to 
obtain €14,077 million (93% of the total) and 4 are commercial banks, which account for 
the remaining amount and of which one is a Spanish medium-sized commercial bank, 
one is a small commercial bank and two are subsidiaries of EU banks11. 
 
 
The aforementioned amount, €15,152 million, ensures that Spanish banks operate at 
minimum levels of core capital which are currently among the most stringent in Europe. 
Furthermore, the FROB funds are necessarily temporary, so, either in the short term or the 
medium term, they foster the entry of private investors in institutions such as savings banks, 
thereby enhancing both the professionalism of their management and the market discipline to 
which they are subject. Therefore the new Royal Decree-Law, in addition to strengthening the 
solvency of Spanish deposit institutions, provides additional incentives to transform the 
banking sector.  
 
The European insurance sector faces a complex operating environment because the 
macroeconomic situation is still subject to uncertainty and because of the tension in the financial 
markets. In this respect, the low interest rate environment is a factor of risk for insurance 
companies, which adds to the difficulties derived from the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. 
Also, the recent regrettable earthquake in Japan adds additional risks from the standpoint of 
insurance companies. 
 
In Spain the risks faced by the sector have not changed substantially since the publication of 
the last FSR. These risks are determined by factors similar to those mentioned for the 
 
11. For more detail in this respect, see the notice published by the Banco de España on the capital needed by credit 
institutions to comply with Royal Decree-Law 2/2011. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/prensa/Notas_Informativ/anoactual/presbe2011_9e.pdf 
 
Law 2/2011 is €15,152 
million and affects 12 
institutions or groups of 
institutions. 
The entry of private capital 
and the temporary nature of 
the FROB aid provide 
powerful incentives for the 
restructuring of the banking 
sector. 
2.2 Insurance companies, 
investment funds and 
pension funds 
 
The insurance sector faces 
risks derived from the macro 
environment and from the 
sovereign debt crisis… 
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European sector. The information available on 2010 indicates that premiums for the sector as 
a whole fell by nearly 4%12. The decrease in premiums is nearly all attributable to the life 
segment (-
 
12. ICEA figures. 
8.4%), while premiums in the non-life segment were practically flat with respect to 
2009 (0.21%). Both multirisk and health business showed increases in premiums (3% and 
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4.2%, respectively), while automobile insurance, which represented 36.3% of total premiums 
in December 2010, continued along the lines of previous quarters and showed negative rates 
of change near to 1%. 
 
The net assets of investment funds in Spain have been shrinking since the international 
financial crisis began (see Chart 2.10.A). The reasons for this are, firstly, because the 
difficulties in the international financial markets have exerted downward pressure on returns, 
and, secondly, because it has probably been more complicated to attract and retain 
customers in such difficult market conditions, as reflected in the adverse performance of net 
subscriptions (see Chart 2.10.B). This latter obstacle has been enlarged by deposit 
institutions, which are fierce competitors in the race to attract household and corporate 
savings and have been continuously increasing their volume of deposits in recent years. 
Although in the first half of 2010 there was a slowing trend in the negative net subscriptions, 
suggesting an improvement, from that time until end-2010 the net withdrawals from funds 
quickened. These withdrawals were partly offset by improved returns, which resulted in a mild 
decline in net assets in the closing months of 2010. 
 
… while the situation for 
investment funds, judging by 
the trend in net 
subscriptions, is also 
difficult. 
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3   New financial system reform measures: Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 
 
 
 
During 2010 both the government and the Banco de España launched a series of measures 
to tackle the difficulties facing Spanish credit institutions and to improve market confidence 
(see Box 2.1). Basically, the measures entailed: (i) temporary public aid in the form of 
preference shares, to achieve greater efficiency by means of integration processes (mergers 
and IPSs); (ii) changes in the savings bank institutional framework to smooth their access to 
capital markets and to increase confidence in the sector; (iii) a boost to transparency so that 
the general public should have the necessary information to make an appropriate assessment 
of the situation of each institution, via the publication of the stress tests conducted; and (iv) 
the improvement of the accounting rules in force to ensure that institutions recognise early 
and objectively the losses incurred on their assets.  
 
However, in late 2010 a second bout of the euro area sovereign debt crisis unfolded. Further 
to the problems in the Irish banking sector and their interaction with the country’s fiscal 
position, a contagion effect to other euro area countries came about. This heightened doubts 
about the quality of bank balance sheets, and in particular of assets linked to the real estate 
sector. Faced with this situation, and along with the Banco de España requirement for greater 
overall transparency on the part of banks, Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 2/2011 on the reinforcing 
of the financial system1
 
 was approved in the opening months of 2011. The aim here was, 
firstly, to dispel the mistrust potentially surrounding Spanish banks, mainly as a result of the 
contagion effect; and, secondly, to speed through and complete the progress already made 
in restructuring the Spanish banking system.  
As for the strengthening of the solvency for all banks, in order to dispel any doubts about the 
Spanish banking system, the new Royal Decree-Law establishes very high capital levels 
which, furthermore, are defined in terms of higher quality capital. 
 
Thus, a new core capital ratio of 8% is required of all deposit institutions, rising to 10% for 
those institutions more dependent on wholesale funding (the percentage of which is at least 
20%, this being understood as the ratio between wholesale funding less liquid assets and 
credit to customers), and which, moreover, have not placed at least 20% of their capital with 
third-party investors. In any event, the level of capital required may be raised by the Banco de 
España as a result of the stress tests to be conducted.  
 
These new requirements introduce a compensatory measure to counter the potentially 
harmful effect that they might exert on the volume of credit for financing households and 
firms: the risk-weighted assets for the calculation will, during 2011, at least be equal to those 
calculated for December 2010.   
 
This new capital requirement incorporates a very high level of solvency since: (i) it must be 
met with high-quality capital (core capital, a concept close to the common equity Tier 1 
capital applicable under Basel III in 20132
 
1. Correction of errors (Official State Gazette of 26 February). Approved by the Parliament via Resolution dated 10 
March. 
; (ii) the required level of 8%-10% is higher than that 
2. The RDL accepts two core capital components not envisaged in Basel III. One is the support extended by the FROB 
to certain institutions in the form of preference shares which, as they have the backing of the FROB, are of higher quality, 
as well as being convertible into ordinary shares in the event that any of the institutions that have received such aid enter 
into a situation of difficulty. The other, mandatory convertible debt, is only acceptable if it meets a series of highly 
demanding requirements.  Conversion shall be mandatory before 31 December 2014, a conversion equation shall be set 
ex ante, the shares are subject to the discretionarity of the issuer regarding the related coupon payment when the 
institution’s solvency status may so require, and they are acceptable as own funds for accounting purposes. 
The government and the 
Banco de España launched 
measures to tackle 
difficulties and improve 
confidence. 
The Irish debt crisis 
prompted a contagion effect 
to other countries. 
The RDL entails new capital 
requirements defined on the 
basis of higher quality capital 
… 
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of 7% which will be required in 2019, when the implementation of the Basel III Accord will be 
completed.  
 
In the event that not all institutions are able to raise the necessary funds on the markets to 
meet the new capital requirements, the RDL also amends the FROB's legal regime. Under 
this reform, when the FROB provides aid, it does so by temporarily acquiring ordinary shares 
on arm’s length terms. Since the nature of the FROB's investment is temporary, this justifies it 
being in the form of ordinary shares, an issue which in turn requires that the entity that 
receives the aid be a commercial bank. 
 
Thus, the main change resides in the financial support the FROB may provide. Compared 
with the previous general rule, whereby such support consisted of the subscription of 
preference shares, the new regulations only allow for the subscription of ordinary shares or of 
contributions to the capital of credit cooperatives, with two exceptional cases aside: (i) 
institutions which, as of the entry into force of RDL 2/2011, had commenced negotiations to 
apply to the FROB to reinforce their capital; and (ii) credit cooperative integration processes. 
 
The subscription of securities is tied to the submission of a recapitalisation plan by the 
applicant bank. This plan must be approved by the Banco de España and will include a 
business plan and commitments regarding the improvement of the institution’s governance, 
increased financing to SMEs in terms consistent with the business plan submitted, and other 
commitments that the FROB may require.  
 
The FROB will determine the subscription price on the basis of the institution’s economic 
value and of what one or several designated independent experts should determine, unless in 
the five months prior to the subscription, real significant transactions involving the capital have 
taken place, in which case that price will be taken into account.  
 
The granting of aid by the FROB will involve the appointment of a special administrator from 
the FROB at the institution, in order to ensure compliance with the recapitalisation plan. In the 
case of the savings banks, the transfer of the banking business to a banking PLC in the three 
months following the approval of the plan, and the establishment of minimum governance 
rules, for instance that there must be between 5 and 15 directors, with non-executive 
directors comprising a majority.  
 
As indicated, the FROB's participation in the capital of applicant institutions is temporary. The 
RDL lays down a maximum term of five years for the divestments of the securities subscribed 
by the FROB, without prejudice to a possible commitment to sell back the instruments in one 
year (two, with additional commitments) to the issuer, or to a third party proposed by the 
issuer. Another notable feature of the reform is that savings bank directors automatically 
become subject to the duties of directors laid down in the consolidated text of the Spanish 
Share Capital Companies Law.  
 
Were a bank to fail to comply as of 10 March 2011 with the minimum levels of core capital 
stipulated in the new regulations, it will have to take the necessary measures to meet the new 
ratio before 30 September 2011, in accordance with the calendar and strategy previously 
approved by the Banco de España. Essentially, these measures may consist of a reduction in 
risk-weighted assets as a result of a special operation (e.g. sale of an office network, of a 
credit or real asset portfolio, or of strategic stakes), the placement with third parties of part of 
the institution’s capital, or aid from the FROB.  
 
…and a reform of the 
FROB… 
…the main change to which 
is the financial support it can 
provide. 
For the subscription of 
securities, the Banco de 
España will have to approve 
the bank’s recapitalisation 
plan.  
After the reform, savings 
bank directors shall be 
subject to the duties laid 
down in the consolidated 
text of the Share Capital 
Companies Law. 
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The Banco de España may agree to an extension of the foregoing deadline to 31 December 
2011, if there should be a delay arising from the formalities and operations to be performed. 
In the case of share listings, this extension may run to 31 March 2012, provided that there 
exists, at least, a resolution by the competent governing body acting as a basis for the 
application for listing, along with a detailed implementation calendar and the assignment of 
the operation to one or several managing entities. 
 
Finally, the FROB governance arrangements have been amended. The FROB will now have a 
Governing Committee of nine members, two of whom will be in representation of the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance. Exemptions are envisaged to the regulations on takeover bids and 
on limits to the activity of newly created banks; specific fiscal measures are detailed 
(especially in relation to IPSs); and certain rules are set in respect of affiliation to deposit 
guarantee funds. 
 
In sum, with a view to strengthening confidence in the Spanish banking sector, RDL 2/2011 
notably raises capital requirements for all institutions. It further determines that the FROB shall 
be the mechanism to ensure that institutions requiring capital but unable to obtain in on the 
market may meet the new obligations. The FROB's participation, if any, will be in the form of 
ordinary shares, and therefore necessarily in a commercial bank, and will be for a limited 
period. Thus, the new RDL not only raises the level of solvency required of all institutions, but 
also provides additional incentives for the transformation of the banking sector. 
 
   0  MAYO 2011 
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